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The Importance of Enforcement to Taxpayer Fairness
Prepared Testimony for the Hearing “Taxpayer Fairness,” October 13, 2020
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Oversight Subcommittee
Leandra Lederman*
Chairman Pascrell, Ranking Member Kelly, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the topic of taxpayer fairness. My name is Leandra
Lederman. I am the William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law at Indiana University Maurer
School of Law in Bloomington, Indiana and the Director of its Tax Program. I have been a fulltime law professor for over 25 years, including over 15 years at the Maurer Law School. My
research includes a particular focus on issues relating to tax compliance and the federal tax gap. I
have also written about the need for increased funding for the IRS.
I would like to make four main points in my testimony:
1. Audits deter noncompliance. Studies show that audits yield substantial tax revenue,
both from those audited and due to very positive indirect effects on tax compliance.
2. The IRS needs adequate funding. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) needs sufficient
funding to have a reasonable audit presence, provide service to taxpayers who need help
complying, and maintain cybersecurity. The budget cuts the IRS has experienced since
2011 have resulted in crippling reductions in enforcement and service.
3. Some taxpayers have more opportunity than others for noncompliance. Taxpayers
whose income is largely not subject to third-party reporting, such as self-employed
individuals, have much more opportunity for noncompliance and, statistically, contribute
much more to the federal tax gap.
4. Enforcement of the tax laws is an important part of taxpayer fairness. If the tax laws
are not enforced, compliant taxpayers feel foolish and lose the motivation to comply.
That is a problem for a tax system that is based on voluntary compliance, particularly
with respect to taxpayers with significant opportunities for noncompliance.
I will now discuss each of these points, in turn.
1. Audits deter noncompliance.
Empirical studies generally find that audits increase tax compliance.1 Audits have three types of
effects. First, they bring in direct revenue. For example, “IRS enforcement activities in fiscal
2017 produced $56 billion in revenue, of which $12 billion was from auditing, while the entire
IRS enforcement budget was $4.7 billion.”2 And, of course, an increase in the number of audits
brings in more revenue, particularly when audit rates are as low as they currently are for the
IRS.3

Second, audits have an important pro-compliance effect on taxpayers who are not audited.
Studies analyzing the effect on tax payments of increased audit rates typically find a very
positive effect.4 This in itself provides a compelling reason to maintain an audit presence.
Estimates of the indirect effect of audits vary from $4 to $12 for each $1 directly collected from
enforcement.5 Thus, the “spillover” effect of audits on tax collections is much larger than the
direct effect of audits.6 Accordingly, an increase in the direct revenue from audits is only a
portion of the gains from increased audits. It is also worth noting that studies have found that tax
penalties do not have nearly the deterrent effect that audits do.7
Third, audits have an indirect effect on the future tax payments of those who are audited in a
particular year. For example, a recent study of IRS data on individuals found in part that “an
audit increases subsequent reported wage income by 1.3 percent and sole-proprietorship income,
reported on schedule C of form 1040, by 14.2 percent on average.” 8 The study also found that
“audits have a long-term effect on tax reporting.”9 Note that this study found that “the effect of
audit is much larger when there is less third-party reporting ….”10 This result is consistent with
the fact that taxpayers have much less opportunity for noncompliance with respect to income that
is reported to the IRS by third parties, as discussed below.
There are several recent studies that looked at the effect of audits on subgroups of audited
individual taxpayers. Those studies generally found that taxpayers who are audited and found to
owe additional tax for that year increase their tax payments in subsequent years. By contrast,
these studies generally found that taxpayers who are audited and not found to owe additional tax
decreased their tax payments for the succeeding years, although the results were not always
statistically significant. 11 These results are consistent with the idea that taxpayer concern about
the prospect of owing taxes has a deterrent effect. Individuals who were not found to owe
additional tax may conclude that they had overpaid taxes (especially if they were issued a
refund) or that they have a “safe” period in which to report less tax, especially if audits are nonrandom.12
It is difficult to be certain from these studies whether a tax collector should select its taxpayers
for audit more carefully—to better identify taxpayers who owe tax—or do more thorough audits,
so as to increase detection of underreporting. However, a recent laboratory experiment found that
“audit effectiveness is an important determinant of the specific deterrent effect of audits.
Taxpayers declare a larger share of their income after experiencing an audit that detects all
undeclared income while ineffective audits decrease post-audit compliance.”13 While further
research in this area would be helpful, this study supports the intuitive notion that audit
effectiveness affects specific deterrence with respect to those audited.
2. The IRS needs adequate funding.
The IRS collects significant revenue to fund the federal government.14 For example, the IRS
reported that “[i]n fiscal year 2019, the IRS collected almost $3.56 trillion in revenue and
processed more than 253 million tax returns.”15 To do its job effectively, the IRS needs funding
for enforcement, for service to taxpayers, and for cybersecurity. In turn, that means that the IRS
needs sufficient resources for such things as personnel, training, and technology.
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In 2011, Congress began cutting the IRS’s budget.16 Congress has cut the IRS’s budget in most
years, so 2010 is the most recent high point for IRS funding, in inflation-adjusted dollars.17 As a
result, the IRS has experienced significant reductions in its staffing and activities. The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently reported that “[t]he IRS’s appropriations have
fallen by 20 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars since 2010, resulting in the elimination of
22 percent of its staff. The amount of funding and staff allocated to enforcement activities has
declined by about 30 percent since 2010.”18
The overall IRS audit rate for individuals has declined from 1.1% in 201019 to 0.4% in 2019.20
Similarly, the overall audit rate for corporations has declined from 1.4 percent for 201021 to 0.7
percent for 2019.22 And this decline in audit rates was before the global pandemic. The CBO
observed that “[t]he disruptions stemming from the 2020 coronavirus pandemic will further
reduce the ability of the IRS to enforce tax laws.”23
Moreover, audit rates have declined more sharply at the top. The audit rate for individuals
reporting $1,000,000 or more of income fell from 8.4 percent for 2010 fiscal year24 to 2.4 percent
for 2019.25 The audit rate for corporations reporting $10,000,000 or more of income dropped
from 16.6 percent to 6.2 percent during the same period. 26 By contrast, the audit rate for
individuals claiming an earned income tax credit reporting under $25,000 of income decreased
from 2.4% in 201027 to 1.2% in 2019. 28
The single largest subcategory of the federal tax gap is individuals’ business income, at an
estimated average of $110 billion per tax year.29 Individual business income, generally reported
on Schedule C of the individual income tax return, cannot simply be checked with return
matching. That is because it is not generally subject to third-party reporting, as discussed below.
A recent report by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found that
the IRS collected substantial tax from auditing “returns [that] contain either a single Schedule C
loss that was equal to or greater than $100,000 or multiple Schedule C forms that showed
combined losses that were equal to or greater than $100,000.… The 1,142 [audited] returns [in
this category] had an average examination assessment of $53,183, which was greater than the
examination results of seven of the 10 Small Business/Self-Employed Division’s (SB/SE) Field
Examination function strategies.”30 TIGTA also “identified 33,176 individual returns with at
least one Schedule C reporting loss equal to or greater than $100,000 that were never considered
or selected for examination ….”31 Without examination, any underreporting on these returns
generally cannot be detected.
As a result of its findings, TIGTA recommended in part that the IRS “[c]onduct a national CIP
[(Compliance Initiative Project)] on tax returns with at least one Schedule C attached, no gross
receipts, and more than $100,000 in losses to evaluate it as a new strategy or workstream.”32 IRS
management disagreed with this recommendation. It referred to changes it had made more
recently, as well as to the need to balance audit coverage across multiple areas.33 IRS
management also highlighted the problems created by budget cuts combined with increased
responsibilities:
The IRS staffing budget decreased over 15% from FY 2013 to FY 2018 and
between FY 2011 to FY 2018 a hiring freeze was in effect. During this time, we
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faced increasing challenges, including implementation of new tax law provisions,
such as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), the Affordable Care
Act (ACA), and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). Over the last two years we
have been able to increase the hiring of enforcement personnel, but with an aging
workforce and increased attrition, it will take considerable time for us to increase
our enforcement staffing at any level of significance. Because of these funding
and staffing limitations, we must make difficult decisions regarding priorities and
the type of enforcement actions we pursue and service we provide….34
This IRS response thus highlights how stretched it is to provide audit coverage and service to
taxpayers. This response also does not fully address the period of budget cuts. In response to a
May 2020 TIGTA report mentioned below, IRS management responded in part that “[s]ince
Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, the IRS has lost nearly a third of its enforcement personnel, including
more than half of its revenue officers (the Collection employees who work the most complex
cases).”35 With staffing and audit rates so low, there is limited possibility to shift resources away
from one area even when it appears that increased audits in another area would be very
productive.
Moreover, the coverage issue with respect to the Schedule C filers identified by TIGTA is not an
isolated case. Earlier in 2020, TIGTA made discouraging findings with respect to high-income
non-filers:
The IRS did not work 369,180 high-income nonfilers, with estimated tax due of
$20.8 billion. Of the 369,180 high-income nonfilers, 326,579 were not placed in
inventory to be selected for work and 42,601 were closed out of the inventory
without ever being worked. In addition, the remaining 510,235 high-income
nonfilers, totaling estimated tax due of $24.9 billion, are sitting in one of the
Collection function’s inventory streams and will likely not be pursued as
resources decline.36
“Reduced enforcement of the tax laws … has perverse effects” including that “fraudsters benefit
more than those who are trying to comply.”37 Restoring the IRS’s budget at least to 2010 levels
(in inflation-adjusted dollars) would be a very helpful step that would bring significant return on
investment. The CBO recently estimated that “increasing the IRS’s funding for examinations and
collections by $20 billion over 10 years would increase revenues by $61 billion and that
increasing such funding by $40 billion over 10 years would increase revenues by $103 billion.”38
Importantly, this refers only to the direct effects of enforcement, not the spillover or positive
indirect effect on voluntary compliance.39 Others have estimated larger effects of increased
investment in the IRS.40
3. Some taxpayers have more opportunity than others for noncompliance.
The federal income tax system relies on voluntary compliance, meaning that taxpayers report and
calculate their tax liabilities in the first instance. The IRS estimates an overall voluntary
compliance rate of 83.6 percent, meaning that percentage of taxes due are paid on time without
direct enforcement activity.41 That figure is fairly high. However, it does not mean that virtually
4

everyone simply complies with the tax law out of an intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. The IRS
has consistently found that levels of tax compliance vary with the transparency of the item.
For example, with respect to wages and salaries, where the taxpayer’s employer both withholds
taxes and reports payment amounts to the IRS, the IRS estimates a 99 percent voluntary
compliance rate.42 Where there is no withholding requirement but substantial information
reporting is required of the payor, the IRS still estimates a voluntary compliance rate of 95
percent.43 Thus, transparency even in the absence of withholding is highly effective in spurring
accurate reporting and timely payment. With respect to income categories where third-party
information reporting applies but is incomplete, the IRS still estimates a voluntary compliance
rate of 83 percent.44 But where there is no third-party reporting—such as with respect to sole
proprietorships—the IRS estimates a much lower voluntary compliance rate of only 45 percent. 45
This pattern in estimated voluntary compliance rates highlights the importance of opportunity for
noncompliance. Taxpayers logically perceive much less opportunity to misreport when they
receive an information return that they know is also sent to the IRS.46 Withholding taxes and
information reporting are not panaceas, and they do impose some reporting burden on third
parties, but they tend to greatly increase tax compliance where they apply.47
Taxpayers with mainly third-party-reported types of income, such as wages and salaries, interest,
and dividends, therefore have relatively little opportunity for noncompliance. That is not to say
that they have zero opportunity for noncompliance. It is certainly possible for a taxpayer whose
income is subject to third-party reporting to invent a deduction that would not be subject to such
reporting. However, that requires an affirmative claim on the return. Such a claim is more visible
to the IRS than omitted income of a variety not subject to information reporting. Without an
audit regime, such taxpayers could invent large deductions or credits with impunity. But such
taxpayers have little opportunity for noncompliance with respect to the bulk of their income.
By contrast, individuals who own businesses have much greater opportunities for
noncompliance. An important part of that opportunity is with respect to the business’s income.
That income generally is not reported to by third parties to the IRS. It would be difficult, for
example, to impose an information-reporting requirement on consumers.48 They generally are
not set up in the way businesses are to provide that reporting. Some businesses also receive some
payments in cash.49 In general, there is lower tax compliance with respect to amounts that lack a
paper trail.50
It is also plausible for an individual who owns a business to claim significant business
deductions for items like salaries, consulting fees, travel, advertising, and supplies. Those may
all be legitimate business expenses. But a business owner might also deduct as business expenses
expenditures that are actually personal in nature, such as transfers to family members who did
not actually perform services for the business. In order to detect such false claims and deter
misreporting of this type, the IRS needs to conduct audits. These audits require the resources to
determine what the facts were of the taxpayer’s business activities.
Note also that employees typically do not have the opportunity to claim a deduction for business
expenses. The deduction of unreimbursed employee business expenses is restricted; they are
5

treated as miscellaneous itemized deductions (MIDs). Many of these deductions historically were
eliminated by the 2-percent floor (only allowing MIDs in the aggregate above 2 percent of the
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income).51 The law generally known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017 eliminated the deduction of MIDs entirely for tax years 2018 through 2025.52 So, even with
respect to trade or business deductions, a very common type of deduction, someone who simply
earns a wage or salary does not have the same opportunity for noncompliance that a business
owner does.
4. Enforcement of the tax laws is an important part of taxpayer fairness.
The IRS’s mission is to “[p]rovide America’s taxpayers top quality service by helping them
understand and meet their tax responsibilities and enforce the law with integrity and fairness to
all.”53 Fairness is thus part of the IRS’s mission, as the IRS itself has highlighted.54
Part of that fairness is protecting the taxpaying public. Former IRS Commissioner Rossotti
explained that “[t]o succeed in its mission, the IRS formulated three strategic goals: service to
each taxpayer, service to all taxpayers and productivity through a quality work environment.
They represent not only the IRS’ goals, but also how it judges its success.”55 With respect to
“service to all taxpayers,” Commissioner Rossotti explained in part that “[o]ur tax system
depends on each person who is voluntarily meeting his or her tax obligations having confidence
that his or her neighbor or competitor is also complying.”56 No taxpayer should feel like a
“chump” for complying with the tax laws.57 Enforcing the tax laws demonstrates to taxpayers
that noncompliance doesn’t pay.
The taxpaying public may not generally have a sense of the types of tax claims high-income or
wealthy individuals make. The recent N.Y. Times reporting on President Trump’s tax returns has
provided examples of the kinds of things high earners may claim on their tax returns.58 It shines a
spotlight on tax claims the taxpaying may public may find unfair when they cannot themselves
generate tax losses that shelter unrelated income or deduct their expenditures on hairstyling, for
example.
Most important, enforcing the tax laws increases the fairness of the tax system. A progressive
income tax tends to reduce income inequality.59 However, a recent study found that tax evasion
unravels that effect.60 This is because higher-income taxpayers tend to have more opportunities
for tax evasion.61 Taxpayer fairness thus calls for enforcement of the tax laws. It also calls for
enforcement where there is more opportunity for noncompliance, even if these audits are more
expensive to conduct because they cannot simply be done by correspondence, for example.
Enforcement depends on IRS resources, so part of taxpayer fairness is adequately funding the
IRS.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important set of issues. I am happy to answer
questions.
*

William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. This testimony
represents my own views and not those of any organization with which I am affiliated or have been
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affiliated in the past. I thank David Gamage, Matthias Kasper, Stephen Mazza, and Susan Morse for
comments on earlier drafts.
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